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Abstract:  This paper studies monetary and fiscal policy rules, and investigates the 
characteristics of optimal policies. The central focus of the paper is on the comparison of 
two types of fiscal rules: a balanced budget and a target for the primary surplus. Balanced 
budget rules (or, more generally, numeric ceilings to the overall budget deficit) are 
criticized because they may dictate higher taxes in periods of weak economic activity. 
The primary surplus rule, in contrast, has a less pro-cyclical nature, given that it does not 
require higher fiscal austerity in periods when the cost of servicing public debt is higher. 
In a nutshell, it allows a higher degree of tax smoothing. It is not clear, however, if 
(inevitable) fiscal adjustments should be postponed. These issues are investigated in the 
context of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model that describes an open 
economy, with capital accumulation, and where nominal rigidities are present. The model 
shows that previous findings drawn from open economy models—in particular with 
respect to the characteristics of optimal monetary policy—do not hold once the 
implications of certain fiscal regimes are taken into account, and once different scenarios 
concerning the degree of capital mobility are considered. The model is calibrated and 
simulated for the case of Brazil, a country that since 1999 has targets for inflation and for 
the primary surplus. The main finding is that a fiscal regime characterized by a target for 
the primary surplus delivers superior economic performance, a property captured by the 
shape of the efficient policy frontier. 
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Policy rules are a popular way to describe, and in some cases, to actually implement macroeco-
nomic policy. Fiscal rules, in particular, became a commonly used device to enforce ﬁscal discipline.
However, these rules are subject to criticism, especially if they dictate lower spending or higher taxes
without taking into consideration cyclical economic conditions. As a consequence, many people argue
that less stringent rules should be adopted.1
When it comes to discussing monetary policy rules, in turn, there seems to be a consensus:
researchers have shown, and many policymakers accept the idea that it is optimal to have small
inﬂation volatility, even if this implies a strong response, in terms of higher interest rates.2
A relevant question, then, is: what are the implications of a policy mix that incorporates the
two policy recommendations: strict targets for the performance of ﬁscal accounts and low tolerance
with respect to inﬂation? A restrictive monetary policy increases the interest cost of outstanding
public debt, and potentially decreases the tax base. In this context, rules that establish numeric
ceilings for the overall budget deﬁcit can be hard to be fulﬁlled. Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2004)
provide an insightful way to think about this problem: “Rules like the [Stability and Growth Pact]
do not simply force Governments to stabilize their ﬁscal policies; they force national ﬁscal policies
to respond to movements in the deﬁcit to GDP ratio that come primarily from other sources”. In
this paper I show that, indeed, this is not optimal.
The goal of this research is to provide a deeper understanding of the consequences of policy rules
and answer the question of why (and when) a certain policy rule conﬁguration might be preferred over
another. This issue is addressed with a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model that describes
a small open economy, with capital accumulation, and where nominal rigidities are present.
The central focus is on the consequences of diﬀerent ﬁscal rules. It is assumed that the Monetary
Authority adjusts the nominal interest rate according to a Taylor Rule3 and then two diﬀerent
scenarios for ﬁscal rules are examined: a balanced budget and a primary surplus target.
O n ei m p o r t a n ti s s u ei nt h el i t e r a t u r eo nﬁscal and monetary policy rules is whether these rules
are compatible with the existence of a unique and stable equilibrium. Leeper (1991), Leith and Wren-
Lewis (2000), Bénassy (2003) and Annicchiarico, Marini and Piergallini (2004), among others, study
1A good example was the debate concerning the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact sealed among members
of the European Monetary Union. It established that the public deﬁcit could not be larger than 3% of GDP. Critics
argued that a more appropriate rule would be to set the size of the primary balance in accordance to the size of the
stock of debt. See, for example, Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2002).
2See, for instance, Goodfriend and King (1997), King and Wolmann (1999) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1999).
Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000) show that conclusions change when wages are also sticky (in a nutshell, the trade-oﬀ
between inﬂation and output variance is again a feature of the model).
3For a detailed discussion, please refer to Taylor (1993).
3the properties of equilibrium in the presence of ﬁscal/monetary rules. These policy reaction functions,
in turn, are used to classify policies as active or passive.4 For instance, ﬁscal policies are “passive”
when the primary surplus is endogenous, in the sense that it adjusts to ensure ﬁscal solvency, given the
equilibrium path of prices pinned down by monetary policy. Equilibrium determinacy and stability
can also arise when monetary policy is passive and ﬁscal policy is active, in which case the primary
s u r p l u sd o e sn o tr e s p o n ds u ﬃciently enough to increases in the stock of public debt.
In the model employed in this paper, the combination of passive ﬁscal policy and active monetary
policy renders the existence of a unique and stable equilibrium. The objective, therefore, is not a
general study of policy combinations and the associated characteristics of equilibrium, but a deeper
understanding of the implications of distinct ﬁscal regimes, within the class of passive ﬁscal policies.
This goal will be achieved by comparing the implications of a balanced budget rule and a primary
surplus target rule to equilibrium allocations, and by examining how they aﬀect the characteristics
of optimal monetary policy rules.
In terms of the existing literature on optimal ﬁscal and monetary policy in the presence of nominal
rigidities and distortionary taxation, this research is related to Kollman (2004), Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe (2004a) and Siu (2004).5 This paper contributes to this literature in two diﬀerent directions.
Siu (2004) shows that the optimal degree of tax smoothing depends on the size of Government
spending shocks. As these shocks get larger, it is optimal to reduce tax volatility and let inﬂation
be a shock absorber, decreasing the real value of Government liabilities. Instead of focusing on the
size of the shock, I argue that the nature of the shock plays an important role when it comes to
understanding diﬀerences in the path of distortionary taxes, implied by diﬀerent ﬁscal regimes.
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004a) and Kollman (2004) study optimal ﬁscal and monetary policy
rules in a closed economy, sticky prices model. One of their conclusions is that optimal monetary
policy features a muted response to output.
The model employed in this paper yields a diﬀerent conclusion: optimal monetary policy involves
a quite strong response with respect to output ﬂuctuations. This is a typical result of open economy
models with nominal rigidities and high degree of pass-through from the exchange rate to inﬂation.
However, the model shows that this also depends on the degree of capital mobility, which plays an
important role in the determination of the optimal policy parameters.
I ﬁnd that, as economies get closer to the “closed economy” paradigm, the inﬂuence of high
pass-through on optimality conditions (not surprisingly) decreases. Results are again more in line
with Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004), i.e. a more muted response to output ﬂuctuations is optimal.
The interesting ﬁnding, however, is that this result also depends on the speciﬁct y p eo fﬁscal rule
being examined, not being veriﬁed, for instance, in the case of an economy whose ﬁscal policy is
4This terminology was introduced by Leeper (1991).
5Other important references are Correia, Nicolini and Teles (2002) Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004b).
4characterized by a primary surplus target.
The main result of the paper is that, using as benchmark a loss function whose parameters are
the unconditional variance of inﬂation and output, then a primary surplus target rule is optimal,
compared to a balanced budget rule. However, this result holds only if, in the event of an increase of
the stock of public liabilities, the Fiscal Authority responds by raising suﬃciently enough the target
for the primary surplus. In other words, even though some degree of tax smoothing is desirable, the
overall conclusion is that ﬁscal adjustments should not be signiﬁcantly delayed.
Does this mean that advocates of more stringent ﬁscal rules (that set ceilings to the overall
budget balance) are simply providing bad advice? Maybe not. The reason is that if we consider a
class of ﬁscal rules that are really comparable (in the sense that they share the same nonstochastic
steady state), and that do not violate the solvency condition of the Government, then one interesting
conclusion is that it is not always the case that diﬀerent rules will trigger substantially diﬀerent time
paths for taxation. In a nutshell, the nature of stochastic shocks matter, since they have diﬀerent
implications for the ﬁscal accounts.
When it comes to modelling exogenous disturbances, the literature focused on generic “cost-
push” shocks. In this paper, a diﬀerent approach is taken. The model explores the role of a shock
that increases inﬂation through its eﬀect on the nominal exchange rate. More speciﬁcally, it is
assumed that the economy faces country risk premium shocks, which trigger sudden exchange rate
depreciation.
The introduction of this feature is common in open economy models that study the eﬀect of
monetary policy in the presence of price stickiness. An advantage of this modelling strategy is that
most economies that explicitly announced ﬁscal rules are frequently subject to volatile capital ﬂows
and sudden changes in the country risk premium charged in foreign loans. Not surprisingly, the
adoption of ﬁscal rules became an important clause of agreements with the International Monetary
Fund, especially after these economies experienced capital ﬂow reversals.
The paper is structured as follows. The ﬁrst section lays out the economic environment. Then,
the technique used to solve the model numerically and parameter choices are described. The model
is calibrated and simulated to the case of the Brazilian economy and the dynamic adjustment of the
economy is analyzed. In the ﬁnal section, the general ﬁndings of the paper and directions for future
research are discussed.
52 Analytical Framework
The framework shares features with Kollman (2002), who also examines an open economy subject
to imperfect capital mobility, given by the presence of debt-elastic interest rate on foreign loans. Like
in Devereux, Lane and Xu (2004), I also develop a model in which the nontradable sector is the one
subject to imperfect competition. These two models do not investigate the issue of optimal ﬁscal
policy. They have, on the other hand, a more elaborate production structure, both in the tradables
and nontradables sector. For instance, they explore the distinction between intermediate and ﬁnal
goods production, and allow for deviations in the Law of One Price.
The strategy adopted here was to simplify the production/pricing structure, in order to make
room for a more straightforward interpretation of the diﬀerences in dynamic adjustment to shocks,
under diﬀerent ﬁscal regimes.
2.1 Households



















t denote the domestic price of tradable goods and nontradable goods, respectively.





























6Both the functional form of the consumer price index and the optimal level of consumption of each kind of good
are discussed in Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1998).
6The international price of the tradable good PT∗
is constant and, without loss of generality, is equal





























Households buy tradable and nontradable goods. Part of nontradable good purchases is consumed
and the remaining is invested (i.e., it becomes addition to the capital stock). One period later, this
increase in the capital stock (plus undepreciated capital (1 − δ)Kt) is rented to nontradable goods
producing ﬁrms. Households also decide how many hours to work (Nt) at these ﬁrms. Capital income
(Qt) and labor income (Wt) are subject to taxation (at rates τK
t and τW
t , respectively). Households
own the nontradable good producing ﬁrms, and receive proﬁts Πt.
Households hold two types of bonds. One type of bond is issued by the Government, denom-
inated in domestic currency (Bt), and pays, one period later, the risk free gross return (1 + it).
Households also hold internationally traded bonds D
p
t denominated in units of the tradable good.
Assume, without loss of generality, that households are net debtors in the external market, so D
p
t is





. Finally, I assume the existence of a cash-in-advance constraint (always binding), where
Mt are nominal money balances:
Mt = γPtCt. (9)




















































Households maximize (8), given the optimal share of tradables and nontradables consumption (3)
and (4), the initial stock of net assets and the cash in advance constraint. They cannot engage in
Ponzi schemes and are subject to (10).
7Optimization requires that the following conditions hold (where λt is the Lagrange multiplier of































































For ease of exposition, I assume that the covariance of the multiplier λt+1 with the one period
marginal return on domestic and foreign bonds, and with the marginal return on capital are equal































Given the assumption that the inﬂation risk premia for foreign and domestic bonds is zero, then (18)
simpliﬁes to the usual uncovered interest rate parity condition:
7It would suﬃce to assume that these covariances are constant, because they would vanish when variables are
transformed to their percentage deviation from the steady state.
8The inﬂation risk is the covariance of nominal returns (in domestic currency) and expected inﬂa t i o ni nt + 1 .T h e
currency risk is the covariance of real returns (in foreign currency) and expected nominal exchange rate depreciation
between t and t+1.
81+it = Et(1 + iF
t )(1 + εt+1). (19)






























2.2 Imperfect Capital Mobility
The interest rate charged on foreign loans to domestic residents is equal to the world nominal





, which depends positively on the size of the economy’s total net foreign











Whenever Dt Â D∗, the wedge between iF and i∗ will increase, depending on the elasticity κ.T h e
exogenous component of the country risk premium follows an autoregressive process (in log deviations
from the steady state ξ)








The assumption of an upward sloping supply of foreign funds is convenient because small open
economy models pose the diﬃculty that they predict a non-stationary path for net foreign assets, a
problem eliminated by the assumption of a debt-elastic interest rate.9 In addition, the presence of
an upward sloping supply of funds may explain the stylized fact that many economies - emerging
market economies in particular - face signiﬁcant spreads with respect to the world interest rate when
they borrow funds in the international market place.
9See Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003).
92.3 Firms
There is a continuum of ﬁrms, and each ﬁrm is a monopolistic producer of a particular variety
of nontradable good (indexed by i, i ∈ [0,1]), facing a constant elasticity of demand φ.C o n s u m e r













t (i)=demand for nontradable produced by ﬁrm i;
Y H
t = aggregate nontradables demand;10
PH
t (i)=price charged by ﬁrm i;
PH
t = nontradables aggregate price index.
I assume staggered prices à la Calvo (1983). At each point in time a fraction (1 − ψ) of the
ﬁrms will set new prices. It has been shown11 that the price-setting decision will be dictated by
the objective of achieving a mark-up over marginal costs that is, on average, as close as possible to
the (constant) desired mark-up that would prevail if ﬁrms could reset prices every period. King and




















A ﬁrm that resets the price at time t (and has it ﬁxed for s-t, with probability ψs−t)c h o o s e st h e
optimal price P∗
t (i) in order to maximize expected proﬁts:
Max














where the ﬁrst term in the brackets are revenues and the second are total costs of ﬁrm i. Substituting








11See Goodfriend and King (1997).






























where MCs (i) is the marginal costs of production faced by producer i at time s. This optimality

















The derivation of the New-Keynesian Phillips curve is based on a linearization of the expression
(28) around the steady state. Typically, this is done assuming that steady state inﬂation is equal to
zero. In order to incorporate the fact that it is assumed the existence of inﬂation in the steady state,
some modiﬁcations must be made. Suppose that, in steady state, inﬂation in the nontradables sector
is given by πH
t . Canzonneri (2002) shows that it suﬃces to redeﬁne the steady state as one in which
nontradable goods prices are indexed to the steady state πH. This means that even when prices are
not reset, they are still “adjusted” by the steady state inﬂation index. Then the stationary prices
and marginal cost are their detrended values. Taking these modiﬁcations into account, the equation
that describes the evolution of inﬂation in the nontradable goods sector is:
πh
t = βEtπh
t+1 + χrmct, (29)
where rmc is the log deviation of real marginal cost of production with respect to its “ﬂexible price”
level, and
χ =( 1− ψ)(1− βψ)/ψ. (30)
The expression for the economy’s real marginal costs is model speciﬁc, in the sense that it will
depend on assumptions concerning preferences and technology. I assume that each producer uses






By deﬁnition, the real marginal cost RMCt is:
12In the expression below, λs discounts expected ﬂows realized (s-t) periods ahead.
13Here I denote Kt(i) the amount of capital used in production at time t, by ﬁrm i. The equilibrium rental rate of
capital Qt will depend on supply of capital (by assumption determined at t-1) and total demand of capital by ﬁrms.



































































2.4.1 Interest Rate Rule
The Monetary Authority has an explicit target for annual CPI inﬂation, given by:
πt = αεt +( 1− α)πH
t . (36)
The nominal interest rate it is the policy instrument, and is raised according to the following “Taylor
Rule”:
b it = µπb πt + µyb yt, (37)
where





b πt =l o g( 1+πt) − log(1 + π∗);
b yt =l o gyt − logy.
In the expressions above, y and i are the stationary values of gross domestic product and the nominal
interest rate, respectively, and π∗ is the target for CPI inﬂation.
122.4.2 Money Growth
The inﬂation target equals steady state inﬂation. For this assumption to be compatible with the
existence of a stationary level of real money balances, it follows that money supply MS must be




In equilibrium, money supply equals money demand
¡
MS = MD = M
¢
. Moreover, the existence
















The Government ﬂow budget constraint is:
Mt − Mt−1 + Bt + StD
g
t + Tt − PH









gt = government expenditure on nontradable goods;
Bt = risk-free nominal one period domestic government bonds;
D
g
t = Government foreign debt, measured in units of the tradable good;
Tt = τW
t Wt + τK
t Qt = nominal tax revenues.
The ﬂow constraint says that public debt maturing at time t (principal plus interest) have to
monetized (Mt−Mt−1), rolled over (Bt and StD
g







Pt = tt , mt = Mt
Pt , bt = Bt
Pt , and use the deﬁnition (5) of the real exchange rate et and of the price




+ bt + e1−α
t D
g


















Let h be the total real amount of end of period government liabilities at time t:




14It is assumed that the each time period corresponds to a quarter, and that the inﬂation target is set in annual
terms.































































































Finally, the stochastic process followed by Government expenditures on nontradable goods (measured
in log-deviations from its stationary level) is given by:








3 Two Alternative Fiscal Regimes
The common feature of the two ﬁscal regimes that will be considered is that adjustments rely on
increased taxation. The two regimes, however, diﬀer with respect to the degree with which the Fiscal
Authority is willing to tolerate deviations from the stationary level of real Government liabilities h∗.
In both scenarios, the following simplifying assumptions are adopted:
(i) The percentage changes in the tax distortions (1 − τW
t ) and (1 − τK
t ) are identical15
(ii) The stock of Government foreign debt is kept constant. In other words, if a deﬁcit is ﬁnanced
with a mix of higher taxes and bonds (case of the primary surplus rule), the Government increases
15Alternatively, the model could have been formulated using the assumption that a common tax rate τ incides on
each type of income. Besides being more realistic, to allow for the existence of two diﬀerent tax rates gives more
ﬂexibility when it comes to calibrating steady state values and trying to match empirical features.
14the supply of domestically traded, domestic currency denominated bonds, keeping Dg constant.16In
order to match characteristics of the data, I further assume that the stationary level of foreign debt,
measured in units of the composite good, is a certain fraction a of the stationary level of domestic
public debt, i.e., e1−αD
g = ab
3.1 A Balanced Budget







that, at each point in time, the operational balance is equal to zero, so that:
ht = ht−1 = h∗ for t > 1 (47)
The Government seeks to keep constant the real value of end of period liabilities. It does so by levying
enough taxes to pay for expenses on goods and real interest payments on the stock of outstanding
debt.
3.2 A Primary Surplus Target
Consider, alternatively, the following rule. The Fiscal Authority sets tax rates in a way such
that the real primary surplus corresponds to a fraction of the deviation of real Government liabilities












= λ0 + λ1 (ht−1 − h∗). (48)
Note that, in a stationary steady state, the real primary surplus is equal to λ0, which, in turn, is
pinned down by the Government ﬂow budget constraint, evaluated using the stationary levels of each
variable. The stationary properties of the model are unchanged, and this allows explicit comparisons
with the case of the balanced budget.
16The purpose of adopting this assumption is to make simpler the analysis of the dynamic adjustment. In this
model, the level of net foreign assets has important implications for the exchange rate dynamics. If the Government
foreign debt was allowed to vary, government spending shocks would have a direct impact on the level of net foreign
liabilities, whereas if public external debt is kept constant, then the eﬀect of the Government spending shock on the
current account will be solely through the real exchange rate.
17Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004) analyze a similar kind of rule and label it “liability targeting”. The main diﬀerence
is that they set tax revenues as a function of liabilities, whereas here the overall primary surplus is set as a function of
liabilities. The implication is that balanced budget and liability targeting rules will trigger similar ﬁscal adjustments
in the event of an unexpected increaes of Government purchases.
15Given the purposes of the present study, I restrict attention to policies in which λ1 is strictly
positive. Therefore, everything else equal, rule (48) does not allow the overall primary surplus to
turn into a deﬁcit in the event of an exogenous increase in government spending gt. On the other
hand, contrary to the case of a balanced budget, the primary balance may not rise suﬃciently enough
to pay-oﬀ increased real interest payments on maturing debt.
3.3 Aggregate Resource Constraint
To derive the aggregate resource constraint, use the deﬁnition that the aggregate nontradable
output is either consumed by households or by the government:
Y H
t = gt + CH
t + It. (49)







= WtNt + QtKt−1 + Πt. (50)















Ct = PtCt. (51)



















Combining (52) with the government ﬂow constraint (38), the economy’s ﬂow resource constraint is















Since, by assumption, PT,t = StP∗
T = St ∀ t then, the expression for the current account deﬁcit
simpliﬁes to:
Dt − Dt−1 = CT,t − Y T + iF
t−1Dt−1. (54)
3.4 Equilibrium
Given the households initial stock of assets, tradable endowment, and the stochastic processes













16(1) Households maximize utility subject to constraints (9), (3), (4), (10), the initial asset position
and the No-ponzi game condition.
(2) Firms maximize proﬁts.
(3) Markets Clear:
(i) Nontradable goods market:





(iv) Domestic bonds market:
BS = BD
(v) Foreign loans market:
DS = DD
(by Walras Law the capital market is cleared).
(4) The Government No Ponzi condition is satisﬁed.
4 Non-stochastic Stationary Equilibrium
A stationary steady state equilibrium is characterized by CPI inﬂation that is equal to the targeted
level (πcpi = π∗), and optimal allocations are constant, in levels consistent with the equilibrium
conditions of the model. I assume that the stationary tax rates on capital and labor income are
exogenous policy variables, set by the Government. The stationary values of the other variables that
enter the Government budget constraint are endogenously determined, and they pin down the steady
state value of Government liabilities h∗. In the discussion that follows, a “bar” indicates stationary
values.
Using the deﬁnition of the real exchange rate, then taking logs and ﬁrst diﬀerences:
et = et−1 + εt − πh
t . (55)
17In steady state, then, the rate of nominal exchange rate devaluation is equal to the inﬂation in the
nontradables sector:
e = e + ε − πh. (56)
Log-linearizing the expression for the CPI index, we conclude:
π
cpi
t = αεt +( 1− α)πh
t . (57)
Then, using (56):
πcpi = π∗ = ε = πh. (58)
Notice that (58) pins down the steady state optimal mark-up Φ, given (25). Moreover, using (13),





Second, in steady state the uncovered interest parity (18) (using the fact that π∗ = ε) results in:
1+i =( 1+i






























Then, since from (61) we know that 1+i
F = 1
β then the following relation must hold:
D = D∗. (64)
The level of tradables consumption is:
C


















































I = K − (1 − δ)K = δK.
Y






















tax = τKq + τWw.


















Together with equations (56), (58), (59), (61), (64), (65), these equations form a system of 22







195 Solution Method and Calibration
The model is solved numerically, based on a log-linearization of the equilibrium conditions of the
model around the steady state (stationary relationships are detailed in the appendix). The method
of undetermined coeﬃcients was employed; more speciﬁcally, Uhlig (1999) methodology was used.
Parameters were calibrated in order to match certain characteristics of the Brazilian economy. They
are also a range consistent with empirical ﬁndings.18 Table (1) summarizes the main parameters and
steady state ratios corresponding to the baseline speciﬁcation.
Baseline Speciﬁcation
γ =0 .15 CIA parameter
σ =1 intertemporal elasticity of substitution =( 1 /σ)=1
ϕ =6 elasticity of labor supply =( 1 /ϕ)=0 .16
ψ =0 .75 probability of adjusting price at time t =0 .25
Φ =1 .1 average mark-up over marginal cost
θ =0 .3 capital share in GDP
α =0 .6 tradables share in consumption
β =0 .9765 subjective discount factor
π∗ =0 .06 target for annual inﬂation: 6%
µπ =2 interest rule parameter
µy =0 .7 interest rule parameter
λ1 =0 .12 primary surplus rule parameter
κ =0 .15 elasticity of interest rate on foreign loans with respect to (D/D∗)
ρg =0 .70 autoregressive coeﬃcient of the Government spending shock
ρξ =0 .80 autoregressive coeﬃcient of the country risk premium shock
h∗
GDP =0 .58 public debt to GDP ratio
D
ge(1−α)
B =0 .50 government foreign debt/domestic debt
Y
H
GDP =0 .72 nontradables output/GDP
g
Y
H =0 .22 government spending on goods/nontradables output
Table 1: Parameters and Steady State Ratios
The model is simulated using optimal policy rule parameters. Those parameters were found by
solving the model with diﬀerent policy parameters combinations and searching for the parameter con-
ﬁguration that minimizes a given loss function that has the unconditional variance of total domestic
18For example Altonji (1986), Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) and McCallum and Nelson (1999).
20output and CPI inﬂation as its arguments. Table (2) summarizes optimal parameter conﬁguration,
for each type of ﬁscal regime:
Fiscal Regime/Optimal Parameter Values µπ µy λ1
Balanced Budget 2.51 .1 −
Primary Surplus Target Rule 2.05 1.45 0.125
Monetary Policy Rule: it = µππt + µyyt
Primary Surplus Rule: st = λ0 + λ1 (ht−1 − h∗)
Table 2: Optimal Policy Parameters
6 Dynamic Adjustment to Shocks and the Eﬀect of Diﬀerent Policy
Rules
Figures (3) and (4) in the appendix display a plot of the impulse responses of selected economic
variables to a 1% shock to government purchases of goods and to the country risk premium.
Before analyzing the eﬀect of each particular shock, it is worth highlighting the most distinguish-
ing diﬀerence between the eﬀect of a ﬁscal shock and a country risk premium shock. Only the latter
triggers a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the path of the tax distortion, across diﬀerent ﬁscal rules.
The intuition behind this result is simple. Think about the consequences of a Government
spending shock. Since the main source of expenditure increase comes from Government spending
on goods and services, the balanced budget and the primary surplus target rule will dictate similar
adjustments. This means that the size and the timing of changes in distortionary taxes will be similar
and equilibrium allocations will not diﬀer so much.
Consider, alternatively, the eﬀect of any other shock that increases inﬂation. It prompts the
Monetary Authority to raise interest rates, increasing the cost of outstanding debt. Since the pressure
on the ﬁscal accounts comes from temporarily higher interest rate payments, now the two rules
dictate a substantially diﬀerent ﬁscal adjustment. Under a balanced budget rule, taxes are raised
immediately to pay for higher interest payments expenses. Under a primary surplus target rule, the
response is more muted: the primary surplus only starts to be increased when the higher cost of
outstanding debt signiﬁcantly increases the stock of public liabilities.
6.1 Eﬀect of a Government Spending Shock
I begin by discussing the eﬀect of a government spending shock on the real stock of Government
21liabilities. By deﬁnition, this variable is constant under a balanced budget rule, whereas under the
primary surplus rule it decreases slightly, as can be seen in Figure (3).
This result may seem counter-intuitive, in light of the increases of Government expenditures,
but an explanation is straightforward. When government purchases of goods increases, the primary
surplus target rule dictates that taxation should be raised immediately, in order to prevent the
primary surplus from falling. This, in turn, prevents the stock of liabilities from increasing. In
addition, since Government buys only nontradable goods, the relative price of this goods increases,
which means that the real exchange rate tends to appreciate. Since the foreign debt is denominated
in units of the tradable good, the cost to service this debt reduces, and this explains the decrease of
the net stock of liabilities. The appreciation of the real exchange rate also explains why, on impact,
the economy starts running a current account deﬁcit and the aggregate stock of net foreign debt
increases.
Overall, the eﬀect of a Government spending shock is signiﬁcantly smaller than the eﬀect of a
country risk premium shock, for a very simple reason: the eﬀect of the ﬁscal shock on the level of
CPI inﬂation in signiﬁcantly more mild. In part, this results from the fact that higher Government
expenditures in nontradable goods crowds out private consumption of such goods, so overall demand
for these goods does not change so much.
6.2 Eﬀect of a Country Risk Premium Shock
The country risk premium shock plays an important role in this model (and, in particular, in the
selection of optimal parameters) because not only it has a larger impact on inﬂation dynamics, but
also because it triggers substantially diﬀerent paths of taxation, depending on the ﬁscal rule that is
in place.
Consider the impulse response of the tax distortion (1 - τ) ,a f t e ra1 %s h o c ki nt h ec o u n t r y
risk premium (Figure (4)). The shock translates into a depreciation of the exchange rate (in both
nominal and real terms) which prompts the Monetary Authority to raise the interest rate. Under a
balanced budget rule, tax rates remain higher, for as long as the interest cost to service public debt
i sa b o v et h es t e a d ys t a t el e v e l .N o t et h a tt h i sc o s ti ncreases not only because domestic interest rates
rose, but also because tradable goods, in which foreign debt is denominated, are now relatively more
expensive.
The interpretation of the path of taxation under a primary surplus target rule, in the event of
a country risk premium shock, is less straightforward. Tax rates are increased on impact because
the tax base decreases, due to the fall of output. A tax rate increase is necessary, therefore, to
preserve the level of the primary surplus. However, since the stock of real liabilities falls on impact
(due to surprise inﬂation), then, one period later, the primary surplus rule dictates a decrease in tax
22rates. From this point on, tax rates persist being below their steady state, and slowly adjust to the
stationary level.19
A consequence of this dynamics is that under a primary surplus rule, the stock of Government
liabilities increases signiﬁcantly after a country risk premium shock. This is the reason why, given this
ﬁscal regime, it is not optimal to have a monetary policy that is very aggressive towards decreasing
inﬂation. Had policy been more restrictive, the volatility of the stock of public liabilities (and
therefore of taxation) would be much larger.20 The diﬀerences in optimal policies implied by diﬀerent
ﬁscal rules are discussed in the next section.
7 Macroeconomic Performance under Optimal Policies
One can think about the implementation of optimal policies in the following way. Under a
balanced budget rule, the Fiscal Authority takes as given the increase of the interest cost to service
the debt (that happens whenever there is a monetary policy tightening) and adjusts accordingly.
The Monetary Authority, in turn, “solves the model” and picks the parameter combination for its




L = ϑV ar
¡
πcpi¢
+( 1− ϑ)Va r(GDP ). (66)
The range of possible parameters is deﬁned in order to ensure the existence and stability of a unique
determinate equilibrium, and in accordance with the goal of restricting attention to a policy mix
characterized by active monetary policy (hence µπ is strictly larger than 1) and passive ﬁscal policy.22
The loss function attaches equal weights to the variance of CPI inﬂation and GDP, so ϑ =0 .5. Later
on, this assumption is relaxed, and the shape of the policy frontier is analyzed.
The procedure was to solve the model assuming a balanced budget rule, for all the possible
parameter combinations. Then the loss function is computed and the optimal parameter combination
19Note that this is consistent with the fact that the Government has to raise more tax revenues in order to oﬀset the
tendency of the stock of real liabilities to raise. The mechanism that allows this to be achieved without raising tax rates
is the fact that the country risk premium shock has a slightly expansionary impact on nontradables output, due to the
depreciated excchange rate. As a consequence, one period after the shock the tax base increases. Another factor that
decreases the size of the required ﬁscal adjustement (also present if the rule is a balanced budget) is the fact that, with
the RER depreciation, Government purchases become relatively cheaper (measured in units of the composite good).
20In fact, the optimal solution comes in the form of a lower µπ and a higher λ1,b u tt h e r ei sn ob e n c h m a r kt o
compare λ1, since this parameter is not present in the case of the balanced budget rule.
21A similar loss function is used by Rudebusch and Svensson (1999).
22I search for optimal parameters in the range µπ ∈ [1.05 ;2.5], µy ∈ [0 ;1.45] and λ1 ∈ [0.025 ;1.5] ,t h el a t e rb e i n g
applicable to the case of optimization under a primary surplus target rule.
23is identiﬁed. As can be seen in Table (1), these parameters are µπ =2 .5 and µy =1 .1.
Next, I examine optimal parameter choices assuming that the Fiscal Authority implements a
primary surplus target rule. In this case, one can think of each Authority moving simultaneously,
after having computed λ1,µ π and µy that solved:
Min
λ1,µπ,µy
L = ϑV ar
¡
πcpi¢
+( 1− ϑ)Va r(GDP ). (67)
Once again, the procedure was to solve the model using a speciﬁc ﬁscal rule (the primary surplus
rule in this case), for all the possible parameters combinations, imposing the restriction that λ1 is
strictly larger than 0.025, to ensure equilibrium stability and determinacy. Then the loss function
is computed, again assuming ϑ =0 .5, and the optimal parameter combination is identiﬁed. In this
case, optimal parameters are µπ =2 .05 and µy =1 .45 and λ1 =0 .125
Table (3) summarizes the variance of certain key economic variables, under alternative scenarios
about the ﬁscal rules and the corresponding optimal policy parameters. Results in Table (3) show
that a primary surplus target rule delivers signiﬁcantly better economic performance, measured by
the loss function.
Moreover, under both types of ﬁscal regimes, but especially under a balanced budget rule, optimal
policy entails a strong reaction of monetary policy with respect to increases in inﬂation (captured
in a high value for µπ, a result that is typical of the literature on optimal monetary policy in the
presence of nominal rigidities.
It is interesting, however, to note that optimal monetary policy under a primary ﬁscal rule is less
restrictive. This reason is that, under a primary surplus rule, increased expenditures on public debt
interest payments are not immediately compensated by a higher surplus. Therefore, if the increase
in interest payments is high (case of a policy that reacts strongly to increases in inﬂation), there is
a chance that a primary surplus rule will result in a larger required ﬁscal adjustment (because the
adjustment is not done fast enough).
Finally, the conclusion regarding the better performance of the primary surplus rule is robust
to changes in the underlying assumption concerning the degree of capital mobility. The sensitivity
analysis performed consisted in increasing the parameter κ, which measures the elasticity of the
interest rate charged on foreign loans to variations in net external debt. Recall that the larger κ
is, the steeper is the (upward sloping) supply of foreign funds. In other words, there is less capital
mobility in the sense that foreign investors require a larger premium to increase the share of these
bonds in their portfolio.
The ranking of optimal policies does not change, but the level of variance of the variables in
question is much smaller. The reason is that, in this smaller capital mobility scenario, there are
forces in action that trigger a faster adjustment to the steady state. In the case of the country risk
premium shock, the sudden depreciation of the nominal exchange rate generates a trade surplus and
24a corresponding decrease in net foreign debt. This, in turn, translates into a tendency of nominal
exchange rate to appreciate, given that the lower level of foreign debt tends to reduce the interest
rate charged on foreign loans.
Another important feature to notice is the signiﬁcant change in optimal policy parameters, espe-
cially in the case of the balanced budget rule. Optimal policy is signiﬁcantly less active (captured by
lower values of µπ and µy), which is not surprising, given that under this scenario there are stronger
market adjustment channels forcing the economy back to the steady state. This translates into a
decreased need for policy intervention.
The case of the parameter capturing the response to output deviations is particularly striking,
since it drops to a level close to zero, even i nt h ep r e s e n c eo fh i g hp a s s - t h r o u g h . T h i sﬁnding is
in line with the conclusions drawn by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004a), who showed, in a closed
economy model, that under diﬀerent scenarios for the ﬁscal rules, it is optimal not to react to output
deviations. The ﬁndings in this paper show, therefore, that this conclusion is closely related to
underlying assumptions concerning the degree of capital mobility.
Interestingly, the conclusion that the response to output deviations should be more muted does
not carry over to the case of a primary ﬁscal rule. A plausible explanation is given by the fact that,
in the model, a country risk premium shock has a subsequent expansionary eﬀect on nontradables
output (because of the expenditure switching eﬀect). A balanced budget rule curbs part of this
tendency, since taxes are raised immediately. Under a primary surplus target rule, this mechanism
is not present and hence nontradables output tends to be more volatile, which justiﬁes a higher
response of interest rates with respect to output deviations. If this model had been designed and
calibrated in such a way that the expenditure switching eﬀect was more mild (or less fast)23,t h e n
the conclusion that the response to output should be muted would probably carry over to the case
of the primary surplus target.
Next, I turn to the question of whether it is optimal to target a domestic measure of inﬂation
(that is not aﬀected so much by the price of tradable goods), as opposed to targeting the CPI. This
is a conclusion typically reached in the literature on optimal monetary policy in open economies with
nominal rigidities and high pass-through.24
The model is solved by assuming that the Monetary Authority implements the following rule:
b it = µπb πh
t + µyb yt, (68)
where πh denotes inﬂation in the nontradables sector and “hats” indicate percentage deviation from
23This could be done with smaller pass-through.
24The intuition is the following. With high pass-through, CPI inﬂation tends to be more volatile, so to stabilize the
nominal exchange rate is a way to prevent this outcome. However, stabilizing the nominal exchange rate prevents the
expenditure switching eﬀe c t ,w h i c ho t h e r w i s ew o u l dh a v ed e c r e a s e dt h ev o l a t i l i t yo fo u t p u t .
25steady state levels. Optimal parameters are found by solving (66) and (67) once again, with the
exception that the unconditional variance of nontradables inﬂation replace the unconditional variance
of CPI inﬂa t i o ni nt h el o s sf u n c t i o n .
Results are reported in Table (4). The volatility of economic variables is signiﬁcantly smaller,
suggesting that this model yields the same conclusion of the existing literature, in the sense that,
in environments with high degree of pass-through, the economy is better-oﬀ if policymakers try to
minimize the volatility of an inﬂation index that does not depend so much on movements of the
exchange rate. The ranking of policies does not change and, overall, optimal parameters are similar
to the ones previously found.
26SCENARIOS LOSS CPI GDP Hours Consumption























µπ =2 .10 .0147 0.0158 0.0137 0.0543 0.0625
µy =1 .45
λ1 =0 .325
Table 3: Variance of Selected Economic Variables Under Alternative Fiscal Rules and Optimal Policy
Parameters
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µπ =2 .50 .0008 0.0003 0.0014 0.0451 0.0017
µy =0 .9
λ1 =0 .375
Table 4: Variance of Selected Economic Variables Under Alternative Fiscal Rules and Optimal Policy
Parameters
288 Minimum Variance Policy Frontiers
The results discussed so far reﬂect the underlying hypothesis that the volatility of inﬂation and
total domestic output receive the same weight in the loss function (ϑ =0 .5).It would be interesting
to analyze whether conclusions might change if diﬀerent weights were assign to each term of the loss
function.
In order to answer this question, eﬃcient policy frontiers were built. The procedure amounts
to solving the model using all possible combinations of policy parameters comprised in the range
described in (66) and (67). Then, for a given weight ϑ, the parameter combination that yields the
minimum loss is selected and the associated variances of CPI inﬂation and output are stored. The
procedure is repeated for several diﬀerent values of ϑ,g i v e nt h a tϑ ∈ [0,1] and then a plot of all the
minimum variance CPI/GDP combinations form an eﬃcient policy frontier.
Figures (1) and (2) depict the minimum variance policy frontier corresponding to the baseline
scenario (imperfect but high capital mobility, low κ) and to the sensitivity analysis exercise (lower
capital mobility), respectively. The shape of the policy frontier reinforces the ﬁnding that a primary
























Figure 1: Eﬃcient Policy Frontier (Baseline Scenario). Solid line: policy frontier under a balanced






















Figure 2: Eﬃcient Policy Frontier (Sensitivity analysis, lower capital mobility). Solid line: policy
frontier under a balanced budget rule. Dotted line: policy frontier under a primary surplus rule.
9C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
This paper studies monetary and ﬁscal policy rules, and investigates the characteristics of optimal
policies. The central focus of the paper is on the implications of diﬀerent ﬁscal regimes, an issue
that is examined using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework, that describes an open
economy, with capital accumulation and imperfect capital mobility.
The main ﬁndings of this research can be summarized as follows. First, the characteristics of
optimal monetary policy clearly depend on the underlying ﬁscal regime. The response of the interest
rate with respect to increases in inﬂation should be less strong (implying the acceptance of higher
inﬂation volatility) if the ﬁscal policy is characterized by a target for the primary surplus. This
conclusion is particularly relevant, given the fact this rule delivers superior economic performance,
when compared to the one under a balanced budget rule.
The requirement that monetary policy should be less restrictive can be interpreted in light of the
fact that the primary surplus rule does not dictate an (immediate) ﬁscal adjustment when the cost of
servicing the public debt increases. Therefore, if monetary policy is very restrictive and signiﬁcantly
increases the cost of outstanding debt, a primary surplus rule may result in a very volatile stock of
30public liabilities.
The optimality of the primary surplus rule holds for the whole spectrum of weights that can
be attached to the (weighted) sum of unconditional variances of inﬂation and output. The eﬃcient
policy frontier associated to the presence of a primary surplus target is clearly superior, delivering
smaller levels of variance for both variables. One way to interpret this result is that a primary
surplus rule renders a ﬁscal regime that is less procyclical than that associated to a balanced budget
rule. However, the primary surplus rule will only deliver good economic performance if the primary
surplus target is increased suﬃciently fast, to prevent large increases in the stock of public liabilities.
Second,t h es p e c i ﬁc way the economy performs under alternative ﬁscal rules depends fundamen-
tally on the type of shock that is being considered. Shocks that aﬀect the ﬁscal accounts through the
cost of outstanding debt are the ones that have the potential to trigger diﬀerent responses of taxa-
tion, depending on the speciﬁc rule adopted. Therefore, it is of utmost importance in this research
agenda to model properly the nature of shocks, otherwise the comparison of ﬁs c a lr u l e si ss i m p l yn o t
very informative, given that they will say little about diﬀerences in the path of taxation, implied by
distinct ﬁscal regimes.
Finally, the conclusion that ﬁscal adjustments dictated by a primary surplus rule are beneﬁcial
for macroeconomic performance is robust to changes in some parameters of the model. Although the
assumption concerning capital mobility does, indeed, aﬀect the level of the variance of the economic
variables, it does not aﬀect conclusions about the ranking of desirable ﬁscal-monetary regimes. It
does have an eﬀect, though, on optimal policy parameters, depending on the kind of ﬁscal regime
that is in place. Under a balanced budget for instance, the assumption of low capital mobility suﬃces
to the generate the “closed economy” result that optimal monetary policy features a muted response
to output ﬂuctuations (even maintaining the assumption of high pass-through). In contrast, with a
primary surplus rule, the optimality of a strong response to output ﬂuctuations does not depend on
any particular assumptions concerning the degree of capital mobility.
This paper departed from the point of view that, despite the widespread consensus concerning
the importance of monetary and ﬁscal discipline, there is still a lot to learn in terms of the conse-
quences of particular policy mixes and the characteristics of optimal policies. There is a number of
directions in which this research should be further developed, such as the possibility of reallocation
of production inputs between tradables and nontradable sector, and the corresponding introduction
of an endogenous level of tradable output. Overall, this research showed that the introduction of
open economy elements changes conclusions previously reached by models that either abstract from
international trade of goods/bonds, or that do not explore the implications of distortionary taxation
and speciﬁc numerical constraints imposed to the performance of the ﬁscal accounts.
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Figure 3: Impulse Response to a 1% shock to government expenditures. Solid line: response under
a balanced budget rule. Dotted line: response under a primary surplus target rule
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Figure 4: Impulse Response to a 1% shock to country risk premium. Solid line: response under a
balanced budget rule. Dotted line: response under a primary surplus target rule
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